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ABSTRACT 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is a growing field of investing that incorporates social 
criteria to the investment decision. The increasing trend towards sustainability has captured 
the attention of governments and investors alike, which has resulted in a rapid growth of 
socially responsible investment funds. A SRI-fund in essence is a normal investment fund 
with the exception that the individual stocks are screened for different social criteria. The 
issue with socially responsible investment funds is that adding several screens to the stock 
selection dramatically compromises the possible investment universe. Thus according to 
the Modern Portfolio Theory, this results in a less diverse investment universe and a lower 
risk adjusted return.  
 
The performance of SRI-funds has been studied throughout during the last fifteen years 
with the most common way of evaluating the performance through comparison between the 
SRI-funds and conventional funds. More recent studies have examined the issue of screen-
ing intensity, where the SRI-funds are compared to each other rather than conventional 
funds. In the empirical part of this study, the effect of positive and negative screening strat-
egies to the performance of the funds in Europe during the years 2002 to 2014 is examined.  
 
The findings of this study were that negatively screened funds have on average overper-
formed the positively screened funds during this time period. Additionally, the empirical 
part provides support for the overperformance hypothesis as the relationship between 
screening intensity and fund performance is positive for negatively screened funds and cur-
vilinear for positively screened funds. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Socially responsible, screening, investment fund, investment perfor-
mance
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Socially responsible investing (SRI), also known as ethical investing, has gained increasing 
popularity during the last decade as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has emerged as 
a major point for policy makers and the public. Environment, society and stakeholders in 
general are all different criteria that corporations are now demanded to be responsible of 
(Renneboog, Horst & Zhang 2008A: 1730). Corporate Social Responsibility itself is de-
fined as a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis 
(Commission of the European communities: GREEN PAPER: Promoting a European 
framework for Corporate Social Responsibility 2001). Issues, for example global warming, 
have made governments initiate regulations that are contributing to ethical investing in a 
positive way.  
 
Because of the new movement towards sustainability, the environment has become a major 
criterion in the investment process and SRI has answered this demand by providing inves-
tors the opportunity to satisfy their social needs by offering products that reflect the inves-
tors' values and provide returns to satisfy their goals (Benson & Humphrey 2008: 1850). 
Essentially this means that investment decisions are not solely based on financial criteria, 
for example risk-and-reward, but also ethical and social criteria.  
 
The trend towards sustainability can be seen in the increasing amount of investments in this 
area of investing. From the year 1995 to 2012 the total amount of managed assets in the 
United States that are engaged in sustainable and responsible investment practice, has 
grown from $639Billion to $3744Billion. (Figure 1.) The socially responsible assets ac-
count for 11.3% of total assets in the United States. (9.3% in 2005) The investment funds 
incorporating environmental, social, and governance factors have experienced a more dra-
matic growth, from $12Billion in 1995 to $1013Billion in 2012. (Figure 2.) (Ussif 2012.) 
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The research of socially responsible investing has also developed simultaneously as the 
trend towards sustainability has risen. The first studies concerning SRI and especially SRI-
funds were focused on comparing SRI-funds to conventional investment funds in order to 
see if investors’ returns would suffer because of the different non-financial criterion. But as 
the movement matured, studies began to compare the performance of SRI-funds within 
themselves. The examination of screening intensity and the effects of specific non-financial 
screening strategies have been the latest trends in the field of studies concerning the per-
formance of socially responsible investment funds.  
 
The largest concern in the field of SRI-funds is the issue of diversification. The Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT) by Markowitz (1952) argues that the performance of a portfolio is 
closely related to its potential investment universe. SRI-funds have to select their compa-
nies from a smaller investment universe which results in a lower diversification, and in the-
ory a lower risk adjusted performance.  
1.1. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of screening intensity on socially re-
sponsible investment funds domiciled Europe and to examine if there is a difference in the 
performance between positively and negatively screened SRI-funds. The hypotheses used 
in previous literature concerning the performance of SRI funds can be divided in to two 
parts. The first hypothesis is the underperformance hypothesis. According to the MPT, the 
screening intensity should lower the performance of SRI-funds as a result of a diminishing 
investment universe. Also, SRI-funds may underinvest in financially attractive companies 
due to ESG resctrictions. In the empirical part of the study, the effect of screening intensity 
to socially responsible investment funds domiciled in Europe is examined according to the 
underperformance hypothesis: (Renneboog, Horst, Zhang 2008B: 304-305.) 
 
H1: The increasing screening intensity lowers the performance of socially responsible in-
vestment funds. 
 
The second hypothesis is the overperformance hypothesis. The intensive screening of com-
panies may result in an exclusion of companies with bad social and environmental stand-
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ards and in an inclusion of companies with superior corporate governance and managerial 
competence, which should result in an overperformance. Thus the second hypothesis is: 
(Renneboog et al. 2008B: 304-305.) 
 
H2: The increasing screening intensity increases the performance of socially responsible 
investment funds 
 
Next, the screening intensity is divided in to two parts. The intensity can be measured in 
both positive and negative screens, with positive screening being an inclusion of certain 
companies that match the criteria, and negative being an exclusion of certain companies. 
The examination of the performance of different funds is done by examining the monthly 
returns of investment funds that are only using either negative or positive screening strate-
gies. In this part, the under- and overperformance hypotheses are examined with funds in-
corporating only either negative or positive screens. Thus, hypotheses 3-6 are: 
 
H3: Positive screening intensity has a negative effect to the performance of the fund 
 
H4: Positive screening intensity has a positive effect to the performance of the fund  
 
H5: Negative screening intensity has a negative effect to the performance of the fund  
 
H6: Negative screening intensity has a positive effect to the performance of the fund 
1.2. Socially responsible investment funds in previous research  
The field of socially responsible investing is fairly young and it has reached mainstream 
popularity just at the turn of the millennium, with most of the studies concerning this area 
of investing published in the past decade. The greater parts of the studies which have exam-
ined the performance of the funds are using the 1990s and early 2000s as a database. (Bau-
er, Koedijk & Otten 2004: 1765; Bengtsson 2008: 975.) 
 
What makes the topic of performance interesting is that socially responsible investment 
funds are only a subset of the whole financial universe, and thus they are not able to invest 
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in the same companies as a conventional investment fund. Clearly this doesn’t apply the 
other way around, which suggests that even the best managed ethical portfolio should only 
perform as good as a conventional portfolio.  
 
Newer studies have tackled the issue of screening and these studies have tried to find out if 
there is a correlation between the screens and investment returns. The common view would 
be that adding more screens would provide worse returns because of the restricted invest-
ment universe, as presented by Markowitz (1952). (Barnett & Salomon 2006: 1106-1119; 
Lee, Humphrey, Benson & Ahn 2010: 351-368.) 
 
Some studies have taken a more unique perspective to the discussion. For example, the 
study of Barreda-Tarazona, Matallin-Saez & Balaguer-Franch (2011) studies the problem 
of investors' investment decisions when taking into account their own preferences other 
than investment returns and diversification. 
 
The consensus in the results of the performance-oriented studies has been that, with the 
exception of some countries, there is no statistical difference in risk-adjusted returns be-
tween SRI-funds and more conventional investment funds, but there is a negative correla-
tion between the screening intensity and systematic risk alongside with a slight underper-
formance when more screens are taken into the investment decisions. (Barnett et al. 2006: 
1118; Lee et al. 2010: 368; Renneboog et al. 2008A: 1737.) 
 
Although the research on socially responsible investment funds has accelerated in recent 
years, the heterogeneity of SRI has been a problem for the research and experts. SRIs frag-
mented state makes it harder for researchers to compare results in different markets and the 
research of SRI would flourish if there was to be certain kind of standards. Although, ac-
cording to the interviews in the UK, the heterogeneity of the SRI is hardly a problem for 
mainstreaming the application of SRI. (Sandberg, Juravle, Hedesström & Hamilton, I. 
2009.) 
1.2.1. Studies comparing the performance of SRI-funds to conventional funds 
The study of Meir Statman (2000), which is the first major study published in the 21st cen-
tury that focuses the performance of SRI-funds, uses 31 different mutual funds as a data-
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base. The performance of the SRI-funds is compared to 62 conventional funds with similar 
size and mean expense ratios (1.50% and 1.56% respectively) during the time period of 
1990-1998. The main model used in this study is the Jensen’s alpha. Also, the study solely 
focuses on the funds existing in the United States. (Statman 2000: 33-34.) 
 
The findings of the study were that the SRI-funds outperformed the reference group of con-
ventional funds, but the results were not statistically significant. When using the S&P 500 
as a benchmark, the average performance of both types of funds was worse than the index. 
With -5.02% annualized average difference for the socially responsible funds and -7.45% 
for the conventional funds, with only one socially responsible fund, The Citizens 
Index, bearing a positive alpha compared to the S&P 500. (Statman 2000: 34, 38.) 
 
The study of Michael Schröder, “The performance of socially responsible investments: in-
vestment funds and indices” (2004), focuses on 40 US, and 16 German and Swiss SRI-
funds and also measures the performance of different SRI-indices. Difference in the study 
of Schröder compared to the previous study, is the time period of 1990-2002, the amount of 
funds, and the fact that this study expands the question of performance to global measures. 
Like in the previous study, the compared measure is the Jensen’s Alpha. (Schröder 2004: 
125.) 
 
The results in the study of Schröder were that out of the alphas of 46 SRI-funds, 38 were 
negative, from which only 4 were significant at a .5% level. This suggests that the SRI-
funds do not underperform their benchmark, consisting of large- and small-cap stocks, at a 
statistically significant level. The most interesting finding in the study is that the SRI-funds 
in the United States tend to be more exposed to large-cap stocks, whereas the German and 
Swiss are more exposed to small-cap stocks. Also, most of the SRI-indices examined in the 
study bore positive, although statistically insignificant, alphas. All in all, the findings of the 
study are summarized in the last sentence: …on average – an investor does not have to 
expect a significantly lower performance due to the restricted investment universe. (Schrö-
der 2004: 131.) 
 
N. Kreander, R.H. Gray, D.M. Power and C.D. Sinclair (2005) use 60 different funds as a 
base to measure the performance of ethical funds in four different countries in Europe. The 
study of Kreander et al. matches 30 ethical funds against 30 conventional funds from Janu-
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ary 1995 to December 2001. The countries used in the study were traditional European 
countries that have been pioneering in the field of ethical investing; The United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Germany and Netherlands with 34, 14, 8 and 4 different funds in each country 
respectively.  
 
The results were that the average weekly return for ethical funds during the time period was 
0.13%, which was identical to the returns for non-ethical funds. The average Sharpe-ratio 
for ethical funds, 0.034, was slightly higher than the ratio for non-ethical funds which was 
0.024. The average monthly alpha was 0.20% and 0.13% for SRI-funds and conventional 
funds respectively, but the difference was not statistically significant. (Kreander et al. 2005: 
1481, 1490.) 
 
The study also examined the market timing ability of both funds, and received similar re-
sults for both funds, that neither type of fund possessed an ability to time the market with 
each of the results being statistically significant at 5% level. The last finding in the study 
was that the management fee is a significant variable for Jensen’s alpha, but the findings 
were different compared to previous studies. (Kreander et al. 2005: 1486-1489.) 
 
“International evidence on ethical mutual fund performance and investment style” (Rob 
Bauer, Kees Koedjik, Rogér Otten, 2005) uses 103 German, UK, and US ethical mutual 
funds as a database with the time period of 1990-2001. The aim of the study is to compare 
the returns of socially responsible mutual funds to conventional mutual funds with an inter-
national database. The main models used in the study are the Capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), Fama-French 3-factor model and the Carhart 4-factor model. 
 
The study finds out that first, the expense ratio, on average, is higher for ethical funds. Sec-
ond, there seems to be no significant difference in the return of ethical funds compared to 
conventional funds, when controlled with factors as book-to-market, momentum and size. 
The study also suggests that ethical mutual funds went through a catching-up phase during 
the 1990s, after which the ethical mutual funds provided comparable returns with the more 
conventional mutual funds. Also, the use of CAPM seems to be inferior when comparing 
the results to that of the Carhart model. (Bauer et al. 2005: 1765-1766.) 
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The study of Rob Bauer, Rogér Otten and Alireza Tourani Rad (2006) differs from the 
mainstream studies by using a non-conventional database that consists of 25 ethical open-
ended equity mutual funds and 291 conventional funds with the time period starting from 
November 1992 to April 2003. The study uses the Carhart 4-factor model to evaluate the 
performance of the SRI-funds, with Worldscope indices used as a benchmark. (Bauer et al. 
2006: 36.) 
 
The development of the studies concerning SRI-funds can be seen here. In previous studies, 
the US market for SRI-funds was always present, but the study of Bauer et al. (2006) only 
mentions US ethical funds in the literature review. Also the use of CAPM is no longer pre-
sent, as previous studies have proved that multi-factor models, especially Carhart 4-factor 
model, are better in explaining the results. 
 
The study finds out that the domestic ethical funds in Australia underperform their conven-
tional counterparts by -1.56% per year. On the other hand, international ethical funds pro-
vided better returns compared to their conventional counterparts (3.31%). These results 
however, are not statistically significant.  
 
The studies comparing the returns of the SRI-funds to those of the conventional funds pro-
vide mixed results. It is clear that the multi-factor models are more powerful in explaining 
the returns of SRI-funds, but the results have not been statistically significant. 
1.2.2. Studies examining the effect of screening intensity on SRI-fund performance 
In newer studies, the status of SRI-funds seems to have been accepted as a true method of 
investing and the performance is evaluated by a comparison between SRI-funds rather than 
comparing them to other conventional funds. Also, the increase in the number of bench-
mark indices have made it possible to compare SRI-funds in new ways. 
 
The study of Barnett & Salomon (2006) uses 67 different SRI funds in order to examine if 
the screening intensity has an effect on the fund performance. No comparison to conven-
tional investment funds is made and the study is purely studying socially responsible in-
vestment funds.  
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The study found out that there is evidence of a curvilinear, non-monotonic relationship be-
tween the screening intensity and fund performance. Also the study found that the increase 
in screening intensity lowers the risk-adjusted performance at first until the amount of 
screens reaches 7, but then as the screening intensity increases, the performance starts to 
grow once again. (Barnett & Salomon 2006: 1114.) 
 
Lee et al. (2010) also studies the performance of SRI-funds from a slightly different angle 
compared to earlier performance oriented studies. As in the study of Barnett et al. the focus 
of the study is to compare the number of screens used and the investment returns. The study 
uses 61 mutual funds in the United States filtered by the standards of United States’ social-
ly responsible investment forum to ensure a homogenous group. The model used to calcu-
late the performance is the Carhart 4-factor model.  
 
The results were that the screening intensity does not have an effect on fund’s unadjusted 
return, but the risk adjusted-performance of screen intense funds is worse by approximately 
-0,7% per screen when using the Carhart-model. Also, the study finds out that there is a 
curvilinear relationship between the screening intensity and systematic risk. (Lee et al. 
2010: 351-370.) 
 
These studies indicate that there is some support for the hypothesis that the performance of 
socially responsible investment funds suffers as the number of screens increases. Although, 
at least according to the two studies examined here, the relationship seems to be curvilinear 
but non-monotonic. (Lee et al. 2010: 351-370; Barnett et al. 2006: 1114.) 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The first part of this paper is dedicated to the introduction of the subject. First, a short 
summary of the starting point for the study is given before continuing to summary of previ-
ous researches concerning this subject. The literature review is divided into two sections 
where first, the traditional performance oriented studies that are built on comparing SRI-
funds to their more conventional counterparts, are examined. This is followed by the intro-
duction of newer studies that are discussing the performance of SRI-funds by comparing 
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them to with each other. Next, the structure of the study is explained after which the study 
continues to examine the concept of socially responsible investing.  
 
The next part, which is the historical review of ethical investing, is focused more on the 
modern history of SRI. This part of the paper is divided by the geographical location, where 
the history of socially responsible investing during the 1900s is examined in different con-
tinents and countries. The absolute roots of ethical investing can be traced all the way back 
to the ancient teachings over 2000 years ago and there seems to be a silent agreement of the 
foundations where the concept of ethical investing was built. Although, it should be noted 
that the sources addressing these matters are not reliable as they are based on ancient teach-
ings that are several hundred years old.  
 
The history of modern concept of socially responsible investment funds on the other hand 
is something that is up for debate. There seems to be no definite agreement on where did 
the concept exactly arise from, and newer studies have found varying results on the emer-
gence of socially responsible investing and socially responsible investment funds which 
also seems to vary between different countries. (Bengtsson 2008; Renneboog et al. 2008A: 
1725.)  
 
There is no clear consensus on what non-economic criteria should be prioritized and a clear 
lack of standards and the heterogeneity of the SRI-market is an issue that should not be 
taken lightly. Although the issue of heterogeneity could possibly be a more of a problem for 
academics only than SRI-professionals, as there is a lack of incentives for professionals to 
initiate standards, but academics feel that a set of standards would help the research to de-
velop. (Sandberg et al. 2009: 529.) 
 
Next, the concept of screening and the fundamental theory of investment portfolios are pre-
sented. Screening in the investment decision has a remarkable effect on the performance, 
and to the risk of the funds. This is because of the compromised investment universe, which 
directly collides with Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory. Screening is at the foundations 
of the SRI-investing and the diversity of the screens makes different kinds of investment 
portfolios possible, but at the same time it has a negative impact on homogeneity and thus 
makes it harder to set standards in the field of ethical investing. The fundamental theory of 
investment portfolios includes the explanation of Modern Portfolio Theory and the concept 
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of risk and return. This part does not discuss the issue of efficient markets but for the sake 
of the functionality of the theories, it is assumed that all investors are rational and markets 
are efficient.  
 
In the sixth part of the study, the data and methodology used in the empirical part of the 
thesis is explained, before going to the examination of the results of the empirical part. The 
sample data used in this paper is consisted of a total of 326 socially responsible funds from 
15 different countries domiciled in Europe from 2002 to 2014.   
 
Finally, the last two parts in the study are committed to the examination of the empirical 
results on the performance of socially responsible investment funds. The aim is to test the 
hypotheses by applying the methods explained in the methodology section, and to examine 
and interpret the results. The paper ends with a conclusion which summarizes all the main 
findings of the study. 
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
Socially responsible investing is a new and highly innovative field of investing and thus 
agreeing on standards is something that is hard for both researchers and investors. This new 
style of investing is continuously integrating new factors to the investing decisions, which 
makes the concept difficult to define accurately. Also, the two major proponents of SRI, 
United States sustainable investment forum (Ussif) and European sustainable investment 
forum (Eurosif) have difficulties in agreeing on standards. Even though they are two of the 
most popular sources of SRI-based data in academic research, it is difficult to even com-
pare them to each other because of the lack of standardization. 
2.1. Definition 
In the study of Renneboog et al. (2008A), Socially Responsible Investing is defined as:  
 
”An investment process that integrates social, environmental, and ethical con-
siderations into investment decision making. Unlike conventional types of in-
vestments, SRI apply a set of investment screens to select or exclude assets 
based on ecological, social, corporate governance or ethical criteria, and often 
engages in the local communities and in shareholder activism to further corpo-
rate strategies towards the above aims” 
 
Another definition for SRI is used in the European SRI-report of 2008 by The European 
sustainable investment forum:  
 
”SRI, a generic term covering Ethical investments, responsible investments, 
sustainable investments, and any other investment process that combines inves-
tors’ financial objectives with their concerns about environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues ”  
 
There seems to be slight agreement on the terminology and the definition of socially re-
sponsible investing (Sandberg et al. 2009: 529-530). Although SRI seems to be the most 
popular term used, there are others that have also thrived. In many cases the terms ethical, 
socially responsible and environmental are used as synonyms (Bengtsson 2008). At its 
broadest, because of the fact that defining SRI is rather difficult, this could potentially mean 
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that a significantly larger amount of assets could be potentially be classified as SRI. For 
example, over 50% of European assets under management have policies that exclude cer-
tain weapons manufacturing companies. (Eurosif 2012.) 
 
The highly changing area makes it hard to for the industry to agree on definitions. Even in 
the annual reports of Eurosif and Ussif, the definitions are constantly changing and vary 
between themselves. 
 
As of now in Europe, the different processes how fund managers incorporate ethical or so-
cially responsible criteria in to the investment decisions are separated into seven different 
categories. The different criteria are explained in Table 1. (Eurosif 2012.) 
 
 
Table 1. Investment criteria (Eurosif 2012) 
Sustainability themed investment Investments in themes or assets linked to the 
development of sustainability. Thematic 
funds focus on specific or multiple issues 
related to ESG. 
Best-in-Class investment selection Approach where leading or best-performing 
investments within a universe, category, or 
class are selected or weighted based on 
ESG-criteria. 
Norms-based screening Screening of investments according to their 
compliance within international standards 
and norms. 
Exclusion of holdings from investment 
universe 
An approach that excludes specific invest-
ments or classes of investment from the in-
vestible universe such as companies, sectors 
or countries. 
Integration of ESG in financial analysis The explicit inclusion by asset managers of 
ESG risks and opportunities into traditional 
financial analysis and investment decisions 
based on a systematic process and appropri-
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ate research sources. 
Engagement and voting in sustainability 
matters 
Engagement activities and active ownership 
through voting of shares and engagement 
with companies on ESG matters. This is a 
long-term process, seeking to influence be-
havior or increase disclosure. 
Impact investing Impact investments are investments made 
into companies, organizations and funds 
with the intention to generate social and 
environmental impact alongside a financial 
return. Impact investments can be made in 
both emerging and developed markets, and 
target a range of returns from below market-
to-market rate, depending upon the circum-
stances. 
2.2. History 
Ethical investing can be traced all the way back to the ancient Jewish, Christian and Islamic 
teachings. Taken from the text of the Old Testament: (Renneboog et al. 2008A: 1725.) 
 
”If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you are not to act as a 
creditor to him; you shall not charge him interest”. 
 
Other examples of ethical behavior include the founder of Methodist-movement, John Wes-
ley, who preached: (Renneboog et al 2008A: 1725.) 
 
“Therefore we may not engage or continue in any sinful trade, any that is con-
trary to the law of God, or of our country.” 
 
The modern concept of socially responsible investing is said to be born during the social 
conflicts during the 1960s as a consequence of the anti-war and anti-racism movements, 
which made the investors realize the social consequences of their investments. Thus, the 
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first modern socially responsible mutual fund, Pax world Fund was founded in 1971. It was 
mainly created for anti-war investors opposing the Vietnam-war with a negative screen on 
weapon contractors. According to the European sustainable investment forum, this was the 
happening that made socially responsible investment funds a part of mainstream investing, 
away from its religious foundations. (Renneboog et al. 2008A: 1725; Eurosif 2012.) 
 
There exists some critique on the statement that the modern application of SRI-fund was 
born in US and started to flow to other countries form there. There are some evidence from 
different studies and releases, that modern ethical funds were founded in other parts of the 
world at the same time during the 1960s and 1970s. (Bengtsson 2008.)  
 
The Methodist church in the UK avoided investing in ”sin stocks” or sinful companies as 
early as the 1920s and Sweden has been a pioneer in the practice of SRI for several dec-
ades. The first Scandinavian ethical fund was launched in the 1960s in Sweden with Nor-
way and Denmark following by founding their first ethical funds during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s respectively. Finland is clearly behind other Scandinavian countries, as it 
founded its first ethical fund in the year 1999. (Scholtens & Sievänen 2013; Bengtsson 
2008.)  
 
There are different opinions on the time and place of the birthplace of modern concept of 
SRI, which seem to differentiate between researches. The history is, as are many other parts 
of SRI, slightly covered in mist and there is no clear agreement between different parties on 
the fact how the modern SRI was founded. (Eurosif 2003; Renneboog et al. 2008A; 
Bengtsson 2008; Sandberg et al. 2009.) 
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3. SCREENING AND THEORY OF INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS 
Socially responsible investing-decisions revolve around the idea of screening. Essentially, 
there can be two kinds of screens, negative or positive. In negative screening, an asset is 
excluded because it directly collides with the ESG criteria of one's investment process, for 
example tobacco industry and pornography. Simplified, this means that companies that are 
viewed as ”bad”, or produce negative externalities, are dismissed from the portfolio. 
Whereas, positive screen means that an asset is chosen because it satisfies the investors’ 
preferences by supporting the ESG criteria and thus, it is selected to the portfolio. It must 
be noted that these screens do not take into account the financial performance of the com-
panies, but only the ESG criteria. (Eurosif 2012.) 
 
According to the study of Renneboog et al. 2008A, socially responsible portfolios, in theo-
ry, should underperform more conventional portfolios. This can be explained in a simple 
table with four different outcomes with four different companies. (Table 2.) One that has 
positive net-present value (NPV) and produce positive externalities (i.e. Reduce pollution), 
one that has positive NPV but produce negative externalities (i.e. Produce excess pollu-
tion), one that has negative NPV and produce positive externalities, and one that has nega-
tive NPV and produce negative externalities. The problem is that conventional portfolio 
would invest in the companies that have positive NPV and the externalities do not have any 
impact on the investment decision. But a SRI portfolio on the other hand would, in this 
simplified case, dismiss the other company that has positive NPV and invest in the compa-
ny that produce positive externalities instead. (Renneboog et al. 2008A: 1728.) 
 
 
Table 2. Net present value and Externalities (Adapted from Renneboog et al. 2008A) 
 Negative externalities Positive externalities 
Positive NPV Conventional SRI/Conventional 
Negative NPV Neither SRI 
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This is rather simplified and does not essentially imitate real life. Also, the supporters of 
SRI argue that social screens represent filters that enable the identification and selection of 
firms with higher quality of management relative to their less responsible competitors. Also 
it can be said that by dismissing the other company that has Positive-NPV, the SRI portfo-
lio is also lowering the risk of the portfolio by preparing for a possible social crisis that 
cannot be foreseen. On the other hand, according to Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory, 
socially responsible portfolios suffer from smaller investment universe, and thus bear more 
risk because of smaller diversification, which leads to underperformance. The diminishing 
investment universe is presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Diminishing investment universe (Barnett & Salomon 2006: 1106) 
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3.1. Risk and return 
 
Socially responsible investment funds are essentially professionally managed portfolios 
which consist of several different stocks, which in this case are screened for different non-
economic criteria. The Modern Portfolio Theory, which was developed by Harry Marko-
witz in 1952, aims to maximize the investment returns while bearing the minimum risk for 
the portfolio through diversification. As stated before in the paper, SRI-funds suffer from a 
less diverse investment universe, and thus in theory they should suffer from a greater risk. 
This chapter aims to explain the theoretical background for risk and return and the Modern 
Portfolio Theory. 
 
One of the fundamental ideas behind investing is the concept of risk and return. The uncer-
tainty of the expected returns in a certain time period of a particular asset is the risk factor. 
Investments with higher returns are usually riskier, because the risk factor needs to be com-
pensated with a higher return.  
 
The expected value for a random variable can be presented as the sum of each possible out-
come multiplied by its probability (Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey 1999: 164). This is pre-
sented in equation (1).  
 
 
(1)                     𝐸𝑉 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Where: 𝐸𝑉 = expected value of a random variable 
  𝑝𝑖 = probability of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ value occurring 
  𝑋𝑖 = 𝑖
𝑡ℎ possible value for the random variable 
𝑁 = number of possible values that the random variable might take 
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As mentioned earlier, the risk component is the uncertainty of the expected return, or the 
probability that the return may differ from the expected return. The variance (and standard 
deviation) of a return is used as a measure for variability in returns in finance. Variance for 
an investment is presented in equation (2). (Sharpe et al. 1999: 164.) 
 
 
(2)                     𝜎2 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑖 − 𝐸𝑉)
2 
 
 
Where: 𝜎2 = variance 
 
 
Standard deviation, which is presented in equation (3) can also be used as a measure to see 
how much variation from the average exists. This term is a synonym for volatility in fi-
nance, which is simply the square root of variance. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 165.) 
 
 
(3)                    𝜎 = √𝜎2 
 
 
Where:            𝜎 = Standard Deviaton  
3.2. Modern portfolio theory 
The Modern portfolio theory developed by Harry Markowitz revolves around the idea of 
diversification. Diversification essentially means that through constructing a portfolio with 
a diverse array of stocks, and investor can reduce the total risk of the portfolio.  
 
The total risk of an investment can be divided into two parts, systematic risk and unsystem-
atic risk. The systematic risk, or market risk, is the component that consists of macroeco-
nomic factors that cannot eliminated through diversification. While nonsystematic risk is 
the component that is made of firm-level risk, which can be reduced through investing in 
several stocks that do not move in the same direction. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 184-187.)  
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First, the expected return of a portfolio must be clarified. The expected return of a portfolio 
is the sum of the weighted average of the returns for individual assets included in the port-
folio (Markowitz 1952: 78). The mathematical formula for the expected return for a portfo-
lio is presented in equation (4) 
 
 
(4)                     𝑅 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Where: 𝑅 = Return for the portfolio 
  𝑋𝑖 = Relative amount invested in security 𝑖 
  𝑅𝑖 = Return of security 𝑖 
 
 
The Modern Portfolio Theory assumes that the investor sees expected return as a desirable 
thing and the variance as undesirable. Now, the actual aim with diversification is to find the 
amount of assets weighed in a certain way, so that the minimum standard deviation is 
found. (Markowitz 1952: 77.)  
 
The calculation for the standard deviation for a multi-stock portfolio is a difficult procedure 
that requires a computer for the calculations. For the sake of simplicity, the portfolio used 
in the example only consists of two stocks which is enough to explain the calculations for 
the volatility. 
 
In order to construct the standard deviation for the portfolio, the covariance for the stocks 
must be also calculated. Covariance measures how much do two variables, in this case 
stocks, move together. Thus, the covariance must be calculated with each pair separately, 
which makes the calculations more complex when the amount of stocks increases. The pur-
pose of this is to find weighted combination of stocks that are negatively correlated, which 
leads to the lowest standard deviation and variance.  The formula for calculation of covari-
ance between two stocks is presented in equation (5). (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011: 241.) 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
(5)                                   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐴, 𝑅𝐵) = 𝐸(𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐵) − 𝐸(𝑅𝐴)𝐸(𝑅𝐵) 
 
 
Where:  𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = expected value of stock i 
 
 
After the individual covariances are calculated, the mathematical formula for the variance 
of the portfolio can be constructed, from where the standard deviation can be also calculat-
ed.  The mathematical formula for the variance of the portfolio is presented in equation (6). 
The volatility can be calculated by taking the square root from the equation (6).  (Sharpe et 
al. 1999: 152, 178.) 
 
 
(6)                    𝜎𝑝
2 = ∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Where:            𝜎𝑝
2 =  Variance of the portfolio 𝑝 
                        𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗 = Weight of the security 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the portfolio 𝑝 
                        𝜎𝑖𝑗 = Covariance between security 𝑖 and 𝑗 
 
 
The optimal portfolio can now be plotted by using the investors’ personal indifference 
curves. (Figure 5). The shaded area in the graph is showing all possible combinations of 
stocks to form a portfolio. The Y-axis is the portfolio return and X-axis is the standard de-
viation. The lines 𝐼𝑛 are the investors’ individual indifference curves and the bolded line is 
the most efficient combinations of the securities, or the efficient frontier. The letters O, O*, 
S, H, G and E represent different possible portfolios.  
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Figure 4. Selecting an optimal portfolio (Sharpe et al. 1999: 173) 
 
The indifference curve 𝐼1 is the most appealing, as it has the highest return for the risk, but 
such portfolio is does not exist as the curve does not meet the shaded area. The curve 𝐼2 is 
tangent to the efficient frontier and has one available portfolio. The indifference curve 𝐼3 
has multiple available portfolios but none of which is as efficient as the portfolio in the 
curve 𝐼2.  
 
In this case, the portfolio O* is the most efficient as it is at a point that is the most north-
west in the efficient frontier and thus has the most return for the risk. Point E in the graph is 
the portfolio that bears the least amount of risk as it has the lowest amount of standard de-
viation. On the other hand, portfolio H has the largest standard deviation, portfolio S has 
the highest expected return and portfolio G has the lowest expected return. (Sharpe et al. 
1999: 173.) 
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3.3. Risk and diversification 
There are diminishing returns in the effect of diversification to the risk. This means that the 
risk of the portfolio decreases significantly at the start when the portfolio consists of only a 
few securities, but the effect of diversification is lessened after the number of securities in 
the portfolio increases. This effect is presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Risk and Diversification (Adapted from Bodie et al. 2014: 207) 
 
 
Few conclusions can be made from observing the figure. First, the volatility of the portfolio 
decreases dramatically at first, but after applying enough stocks to the portfolio, the impact 
of diversification to the volatility lowers. Second, the market risk remains stationary, and 
cannot be diversified, thus the only risk that an investor should take account for after suffi-
cient diversification, is the market risk. 
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The beta coefficient, used also in the previous figure, measures the stock’s exposure to the 
market volatility. Simply put, beta coefficient signifies how an individual stock moves in 
relation to the market. The market, or in this case the market portfolio, is used as a bench-
mark for beta, and thus has it has a beta value of 1. 
 
A stock with a beta coefficient more than 1 is called an aggressive stock, which means that 
the volatility of the stock is higher than that of the market portfolio. Vice versa, a beta value 
which is lower than 1 implies lower volatility than the market portfolio. The mathematical 
formula for calculating the beta is presented below in equation (6). (Sharpe et al. 1999: 
183.) 
 
 
(7)                     𝛽𝑖 =
𝜎𝑖𝑚
𝜎𝑚2
=
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑚𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚𝑡)
 
 
 
Where: 𝛽𝑖 = Beta coefficient for stock i 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑚𝑡) = Covariance between the market return and the return of 
stock i 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚𝑡) = the variance of the market return 
 
 
The beta coefficient varies with time. Longer time periods result in better estimate, as dif-
ferent time periods can give greatly varying results. 
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 5. METHODS IN EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE 
The methods for evaluating the performance of socially responsible investment funds have 
taken significant steps during the past two decades. The earliest SRI-studies published in 
the 1990s used the single factor Capital Asset Pricing Model as a way of evaluation, but the 
methods have evolved since. The use of multifactor models, for example Fama-French 
three factor model and the Carhart four-factor model, has gained popularity in the process 
of examining the performance of SRI-funds compared to conventional funds (Bauer et al. 
2006). This chapter aims to explain the functions of the models and to examine the progress 
of the models used in the studies. 
 5.1. Sharpe Index 
Sharpe Index, also known as an excess return to variability measure or Sharpe ratio, was 
developed by William F. Sharpe. The Sharpe Index measures the risk-adjusted performance 
of the portfolio by adjusting the excess returns of the portfolio with the volatility of the 
portfolio. The mathematical formula for Sharpe Index is presented in equation (7). (Elton, 
Gruber, Brown & Goetzmann 2011: 636-637; Sharpe 1966: 123.) 
 
 
(8)                     𝑆𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑝
 
 
 
Where: 𝑅𝑝 = Mean return of the portfolio 
  𝑅𝑓 = Risk free rate 
  𝜎𝑝 = Standard deviation of the portfolio 
 
 
Large positive value of Sharpe ratio indicates that the portfolio has performed superiorly 
when the risk is accounted for. Vice versa, a negative value would indicate that the portfo-
lio does not perform sufficiently for the risk its bearing.  
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5.2. Treynor Index 
The Treynor Index, developed by Jack L. Treynor (1965) measures the performance of the 
portfolio adjusted by the non-diversifiable risk, also known as beta-value. The formula for 
Treynor Index is presented in equation (8) (Elton et al. 2011: 641; Treynor 1965: 63-75.) 
 
 
(9)                    𝑇𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝛽𝑝
 
 
 
Where: 𝑅𝑝 = Mean return of the portfolio 
  𝑅𝑓 = Risk free rate 
𝛽𝑝 = Beta of the portfolio 
 
 
The Treynor index is very similar to the Sharpe Index. Instead of using the standard devia-
tion, Treynor index uses only the market risk, which is the beta value of the portfolio. The 
beta value of the portfolio is simply the sum of weighted average of individual betas in the 
portfolio. A higher Treynor measure indicates a superior portfolio performance. 
5.3. Sortino ratio 
The Sortino ratio, developed by Frank A. Sortino and Lee N. Price in 1994 is a perfor-
mance measure similar to Sharpe ratio. The difference compared to the Sharpe is that the 
Sortino ratio only takes in to account the downside, or unwanted, deviation of the fund. It 
has been shown that the Sortino ratio is more powerful in explaining skewed distributions 
than Sharpe, but with normal distributions the results are similar that of the Sharpe ratio. 
The formula for Sortino ratio is given in equation 10. (Ashraf & Johnson 2008: 485-502.) 
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(10)                  𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑜 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓
𝐷𝐷𝑝
 
 
 
Where: 𝐷𝐷𝑝= Downside deviation of the portfolio 
5.4. Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha was first used as a measure by Michael Jensen in 1968 (Jensen 1968: 389-
416). It measures the abnormal return between the return predicted by CAPM and the port-
folio. The formula for alpha is presented in equation (10). 
 
 
(11)                    𝛼𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝 − [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)] 
 
 
Where: 𝑅𝑝 = Mean return of the portfolio 
  𝑅𝑓 = Risk free rate 
𝛽𝑝 = Beta of the portfolio 
𝑅𝑚 = Mean return of market index 
 
 
Jensen’s alpha is one of the most widely used measures in the evaluation of the portfolio 
performance. Positive alpha signals positive abnormal returns over the returns of the return 
predicted by CAPM and superior portfolio management compared to the market portfolio. 
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2014: 840.) 
5.5. Multi-factor models 
The use of multifactor models has experienced a rapid growth since the study of Fama & 
French (1993). The basic idea behind the use of these models is to extend the explanatory 
power of single factor models by adding new variables which are intended to capture a 
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more wide range of risk. The general formula for a multi-factor model is presented in equa-
tion (10). (Bodie et al. 2014: 324-327, 340-342.) 
 
 
(12)                  𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚𝑅𝑚 + 𝛽1𝐹1 + 𝛽2𝐹2 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑛𝐹𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
 
Where: 𝑅𝑖 = Return of a security i 
   𝛼𝑖 = Constant 
  𝛽𝑚 = Beta respect to the market 
  𝑅𝑚 = Market Return 
  𝐵𝑛 = Beta respective to each Factor 
  𝐹𝑛 = Explanatory factor 
  𝑒𝑖 = Error term 
   
The two most profilic multi-factor models used in the academic literature are the Fama-
French 3-Factor model and the Carhart 4-factor model. The former was developed by Eu-
gene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French in 1993, which, extends the single factor model by 
accounting new variables, Small minus Big (SMB), and High minus Low (HML) to the 
existing model. The factor SMB measures the excess performance of small stocks over 
large stocks, while the factor HML measures the excess performance of value stocks over 
growth stocks. The study of Fama & French justified the use these variables through empir-
ical observations. (Bodie et al 2014: 340-341; Fama & French 1996: 55-84.) 
 
The Carhart 4-factor model extends the Fama-French 3-factor model by adding the momen-
tum factor, which captures the Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) momentum anomaly. Momen-
tum factor is the difference in return between a portfolio of past 12 month winners and a 
portfolio of past 12 month losers. (Carhart, M., 1997: 57–82; Bauer et al. 2005: 37.) 
 
The Carhart 4-factor model has since been extended to a five factor model by Fama & 
French (2014) by adding profitability and investment factors to their original 3-factor mod-
el. Because of the young age of the model, the studies have not yet adapted the use of the 
model, but it should be expected to see the usage of the model in near future. 
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The methods listed in this chapter are the most commonly used models in the literature re-
viewed in this paper. These methods are also used in the empirical part of the study in this 
paper. 
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6. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter explains the data and methodology used in the empirical part of the study. 
First, the selection of the data is explained. Then the description of the data is presented 
before continuing to the methodology and the limitations of the study. 
6.1. Data selection 
As the idea of the empirical study is to examine the performance of SRI-funds according to 
their respective screening intensity, the SRI-funds must be first screened from conventional 
funds. Screening the mutual funds for socially responsible investment funds is difficult and 
most of the databases, including Morningstar, do not offer efficient search methods for free. 
The sample is also restricted to European funds only, because of the prevalence of positive 
screening strategies in Europe compared to the United States. Ussif could’ve provided a 
reliable listing of SRI-funds domiciled in the United States, but Eurosif does not deliver the 
same kind of data. This is why this paper used a free socially responsible investment-
database called YourSRI. As the concept of SRI-funds is relatively new, the amount of 
funds has increased exponentially during the last decade, and thus the data period is re-
stricted to 2002 to 2014 in order to capture as many funds as possible. 
 
YourSRI is a part of CSSP (Center for Social and Sustainable Products AG) which an inde-
pendent consulting and research house with a focus on responsible investments, impact 
investments and corporate social responsibility (YouSRI). CSSP is also in partnership with 
Eurosif and PRI, which is an initiative supported by the United Nations, of which goal is to 
understand the implications of sustainability for investors and support signatories to incor-
porate these issues into their investment decision making and ownership practices (YourS-
RI). 
 
The database of YourSRI covers hundreds of socially responsible investment funds all 
around the world. The sample is first screened, in line with previous literature, by including 
investment funds that are investing in equity only. Next, the SRI-funds are restricted to 
funds domiciled in Europe only. This restricted the sample to 440 SRI-funds.  
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The raw sample data used in the study consists of 440 socially responsible investment 
funds from 15 different countries in Europe, which include Austria, Belgium Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, Switzerland and The United Kingdom. Each of the funds is applying at least 
one ethical screen to the fund. The distribution by country is presented in figure 6. 
 
 
 
Seen from the figure, the three countries with the largest number of SRI-funds are Luxem-
bourg, France and the United Kingdom with Switzerland coming at fourth. The most strik-
ing difference between the top-3 three countries is the relative amount of domestic funds. A 
total of 175 SRI-funds, almost 40% of all the funds used in the study, is domiciled in Lux-
Figure 6. Distribution of SRI-funds in the raw sample data by country 
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embourg, but the only 15 of the funds are registered for sale in Luxembourg only. The ma-
jority of the funds are sold in other countries, which is due to tax reasons. The same kind 
distribution between domestic and non-domestic funds can be seen in Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland and Liechtenstein.  
 
In the sample data, the amount of different screens used by the funds was 30. The most 
common screening strategy, which was used by almost 70% of the funds in the sample was 
ESG-screening, which is a broad-based complicated screening strategy which incorporates 
environmental, social and governance factors to the investment decision. The next two most 
common screens were the exclusion of firms in relation with the production armaments or 
tobacco. The relative distribution of screens is presented in figure 7. 
 
The screens Environmental, Social, Governance or their combination ESG was used by 
96% of the funds in the data sample. These four screens are essentially all positive screens 
which are implying a general theme of the fund. Because the four screens cover almost all 
of the funds, and the definition is relatively vague, the empirical study in this paper omits 
these wide screening strategies and only examines the effect of positive impact themes to 
the funds. As several funds in the sample use only one screen that is either one of the before 
mentioned, these funds are excluded from the empirical study. A total of 4 funds were also 
excluded from the sample due to inconsistencies in the time series data. This brings the 
final sample size to 326 funds.  
 
Positive impact screens applied by the SRI-funds are Renewable energy/Cleantech, Energy 
Efficiency, Water, Recycling, Carbon Emissions, Mobility, Agriculture, Health, Forestry 
and Green Building. The negative screens are Armaments, Tobacco, Gambling, Nuclear 
power, Adult Content, Violation of Human Rights, Alcohol, Violation of Labour Rights, 
Genetically Modified Organisms, Violation of Global Compact, Animal Testing, Agro-
chemicals, Controversial Eco Methods, Mining and Oil Production. (YourSRI.) 
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Figure 7. The Distribution of screens applied by % of funds. 
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After restricting the funds to 326 different SRI-fund, the daily data for each fund was ob-
tained from datastream. As some funds have updated the prices only once week, the daily 
returns have been changed to compounded monthly returns in order to dispose the effect of 
daily variation. After transforming the daily data to monthly return for each fund, several 
different portfolios are formed according to the screening intensity and screen type.  
6.2. Methodology of the empirical part 
The empirical part of the study revolves around the examination of the performance of SRI-
funds according to their screening intensity. The hypotheses are first studied by applying an 
independent samples T-test to different portfolios which are formed based on the screen 
type and screening intensity. Then a multi-factor regression is applied to different portfolios 
sorted by their screens. The aim of the regressions is to capture the characteristics of SRI-
funds employing different amount of screens.  
 
In order to test the statistical difference between two sample groups, the Student’s T-test is 
applied. The test measures the difference of means between the sample groups in order to 
see if the variables of the sample groups are on average statistically different. The statistical 
significance is expressed at levels 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10. The formula for T-test is given in 
equation 13. (Ruxton 2006: 688.) 
 
 
(13)                                𝑡 =  
𝑥1̅̅̅ −  𝑥2̅̅ ̅
√(
𝜎1
2
𝑛1
+  
𝜎2
2
𝑛2
)
 
 
Where:   𝑥?̅? = mean of the sample i 
   𝜎𝑖
2 =  variance of the sample i 
   𝑛𝑖 =   degrees of freedom in the paired sample 
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The degrees of freedom in the Student’s T-test is calculated as: 
 
(14)                               𝑑𝑓 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 − 2 
 
Where:  𝑛𝑖 =  amount of variables in sample i 
 
 
The result of the T-test tells if the difference between the two sample groups is statistically 
different or not. If the p-value of the test is less than 0.1, the null hypothesis, that the aver-
age performance of the two groups does not differ from each other, is rejected on a 10% 
level. If the p-value is over 0.1, the null hypothesis is accepted, which tells that the average 
performance of the two sample groups is not statistically different. 
 
After the T-tests are applied to the samples, in order to study the effects of screening inten-
sity to the funds, multi-factor regressions are applied to the data set. This captures the effect 
of the screens to the fund performance and shows the differences in the characteristics of 
the funds. 
 
The main regression used in the study is the Carhart 4-factor model shown in equation 15. 
The regressions in this paper are presented in a style where the factors are applied one after 
another. The purpose of this method is to examine the significance of the factors more 
clearly. Essentially this means that the first regression is the Jensen’s alpha single factor 
model. This is followed by a two factor model and the Fama-French 3-factor model. With 
the addition of the final momentum factor, the Carhart-4 factor model is used. The factors 
were obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The use of Fama-French 5-factor model 
would be the ideal choice, but the variables for European markets were not yet available. 
(Kenneth R. French Data Library.) 
 
 
(15)                  𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
Where: SMB = Small minus Big 
  HML = High minus Low 
  WML = Winners minus Losers 
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The study uses two different proxies for a market benchmark. As the SRI-funds are con-
structed by applying different environmental, social and governance screens, a conventional 
benchmark may not be the suitable in explaining the performance of SRI-funds. This is 
why the first proxy used for market benchmark is the STOXX Europe Sustainability index. 
The index consists of almost 300 companies screened for ESG criteria from 18 different 
countries from Europe (STOXX Europe Sustainability). 
 
The previous literature has shown that the ethical stock indices can be less powerful in ex-
plaining the performance of socially responsible investment funds (Bauer et al. 2005). Also, 
the SRI-funds in Europe are more exposed to small cap stocks whereas the funds in United 
States are more exposed to large cap stocks. Thus, the MSCI IMI Europe index is also used 
as a more conventional market index in order to see the differences between the indices. 
The MSCI IMI Europe captures the presentation of Large, Medium and Small cap compa-
nies from 15 different countries in Europe. The risk free rate used in the study is the Euro-
pean rate obtained from Kenneth French’s website. (MSCI, Kenneth R. French Data Li-
brary.) 
6.3. Limitations of the empirical study 
The list of different SRI-funds is imported from the database of yourSRI. Although the site 
is a partner of the United Nations’s principles of responsible investing, the legitimacy of the 
data could be questioned. The list of screens used by each of the funds is also drawn from 
yourSRI. This paper also assumes that the screening strategies used by the funds stay the 
same during the whole observation period, which could result in inaccurate results for re-
spective portfolios. 
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7. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
This part of the thesis focuses on the results of the empirical study. First, the descriptive 
statistics of the data is given. Next, effect of screening intensity of both positive and nega-
tive screens is examined by applying a T-test to different sample groups. This is followed 
by applying the Carhart 4-factor regressions to the whole sample before applying the same 
regression to different portfolios sorted by the type of screens. 
7.1. Descriptive statistics 
In order to see the characteristics of the sample data, descriptive statistics of the data is giv-
en. The descriptive for the sample data of the study is presented in table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
Type of fund Variable  Min      Mean               Max                  Stdev           Skewness      Kurtosis 
Whole sample MonthlyR  -0.532      0.003               0.433                0.049           -0.925           4.510                               
n = 326  Alpha  -1.961      0.045               0.981                0.378           -0.970         3.268              
  Sharpe  -0.174      0.058               0.476                0.111            0.942           1.120  
  Sortino  -0.205      0.087               0.961                0.168            1.515       3.284 
Positive  MontlhyR  -0.532      0.002               0.433                0.053            -0.955              6.871  
n = 81  Alpha  -1.961     -0.034               0.981                0.485            -1.073              3.133  
  Sharpe  -0.145      0.058               0.476                0.122             1.108           1.559  
  Sortino  -0.183      0.098               0.961                0.201             1.716       4.070 
Negative  MonthlyR  -0.309      0.003               0.341                0.046                 -0.839                  3.137  
n = 187  Alpha  -0.880      0.062               0.947    0.314                 -0.242                     0.544  
  Sharpe  -0.115      0.063               0.409                0.104                  1.108          1.143       
  Sortino  -0.143             0.089                 0.734                 0.150                1.510                     2.703 
 
 
Looking at the descriptive statistics, the average alphas for positively screened funds are 
lower compared to the rest of the sample, which implies that the funds have performed 
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Figure 8. Sharpe & Sortino ratios for the whole sample 
worse compared to rest of the funds, whereas the negative funds have performed better on 
average than rest of the funds. The skewness for the whole sample of alphas show that the 
returns are concentrated to right side of the mean with the extreme values being on the left 
side. The same goes for positive and negative funds, although the skewness is less pro-
nounced in negative funds.  
 
The kurtosis is over 3 for alphas in the whole sample and for the positive funds. Especially 
the kurtosis in the positive funds show that the peak in the distribution is very sharp and 
there is a high probability for extreme values. The kurtosis for negative funds is only 0.544, 
which tells that the distribution is flat and the probability for extreme values is lower.  
 
The Sharpe and Sortino ratios for screened portfolios are presented in figures 8-10. The 
Sharpe and Sortino ratios would be identical to each other if the alphas would be normally 
distributed. The ratios show signs of correlation with the screening intensity in the case of 
negatively screened funds, but in other cases there seems to be no consistency.  
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Figure 10.  Sharpe & Sortino ratios for negatively screened funds 
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7.2. Independent samples T-tests 
In order to test the statistical difference in the performance of the funds according to the 
type of fund and screening intensity, a T-test is applied to the data set. The first test (1) tests 
the difference between alphas of portfolios applying 1-4 screens and 5-13 screens covering 
the sample of 326 funds. The second (2) test tests the difference in alphas between nega-
tively screened portfolios and positively screened portfolios. The third (3) T-test tests the 
difference in alphas between the lowest screened positive portfolios and the highest 
screened positive portfolios. The fourth test (4) examines the differences in alphas between 
the lowest screened negative portfolios and highest screened negative portfolios. The re-
sults are given in table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Results for the T-tests 
Test  t  p  Mean difference   Std error difference 
(1)   -1.856  0.064  0.040    0.002 
(2)  1.933  0.054  0.096    0.031  
(3)  -0.246  0.807  0.026    0.032 
(4)  -2.136  0.034  0.097    0.011 
 
 
The results of the T-tests indicate the following. The results for the first test show that there 
is a difference in low screened portfolios and high screened portfolios, which is statistically 
significant and the null hypothesis is rejected at a 10% level. As a support for the overper-
formance hypothesis, the relationship seems to be positive indicated by the negative T-
value. The negative and positive sample groups are statistically different on a 10% level 
indicated by the p value of 0.054, and thus the null hypothesis is rejected. This implies that 
the alphas for negatively screened funds are on average higher than for the positively 
screened portfolios on a 10% level. Also, the T-test for the difference of low screened nega-
tive funds and high screened negative funds is statistically significant at 5% level. The neg-
ative T-value tells that on average, the high screened portfolios perform better compared to 
the low screened portfolios. This result also supports the overperformance hypothesis for 
the negatively screened funds. There seems to be no significance in the screening intensity 
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of positive portfolios, although if the effect of screening intensity to the performance of the 
fund happens to be U-shaped, the effect doesn’t necessarily show in the T-tests. In the next 
three parts, the hypotheses 1-6 are examined by applying multiple factor regressions to the 
data set.  
7.3. The effect of screening intensity to the performance of SRI-funds 
In order to examine the effect of screening intensity to the performance of SRI-funds more 
closely, the Carhart 4-factor regression is applied to equally weighted portfolios, which are 
formed according to the number of screens used by the sub funds. Table 5. reports the ef-
fects of screening intensity with MSCI IMI Europe used as the market proxy. Table 6. re-
ports the results for the same proxy but with merged portfolios. Tables 7-8 report the same 
estimated coefficients for the same factors, but this time using the STOXX Europe Sustain-
ability index as the market benchmark. 
 
 
Table 5. The effect of screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs MSCI IMI 
Europe  
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1  0.05   0.96***                      0.94
  0.02   0.97***  0.15***                    0.94 
  0.04  0.99***  0.16***  -0.08*                  0.94 
  0.04  0.98***  0.16***  -0.08*  -0.01                0.94 
2  -0.08  0.99***                      0.92 
  -0.05  1.00***  0.22***                    0.93 
  -0.03  1.02***  0.23***  -0.07                  0.93 
  -0.04  1.02***  0.23***  -0.07  0.01                0.93 
3  -0.00  1.01***                      0.82 
  -0.12  1.05***  0.57***                    0.87 
  -0.05  1.09***  0.59***  -0.26***                  0.88 
  -0.06  1.10***  0.59***  -0.25***  0.01                0.88 
4   0.08  0.90***                      0.91 
   0.03  0.92***  0.27***                    0.92 
   0.07  0.94***  0.29***  -0.14***                  0.93 
   0.08  0.94***  0.29***  -0.14***  -0.01                0.92 
5  -0.00  0.97***                      0.94 
  -0.03  0.98***  0.13***                    0.94 
  0.02  1.00***  0.14***  -0.15***                  0.95 
  0.05  0.99***  0.15***  -0.16***  -0.03                0.95 
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Table 5. Continued 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
6  0.05  0.91***                      0.91 
  0.00  0.93***  0.23***                              0.92 
  0.04  0.96***  0.24***  -0.16***                  0.92 
  0.10  0.93***  0.25***  -0.17***  -0.05**                0.92 
7  0.05  0.86***                      0.88 
  -0.01  0.89***  0.31***                    0.91 
  0.01  0.90***  0.32***  -0.07                  0.91 
  -0.02  0.91***  0.32***  -0.06  0.03                0.91 
8  0.14  0.95***                      0.88 
  0.07  0.97***  0.34***                    0.90 
  0.09  0.99***  0.35***  -0.09                  0.90 
  0.10  0.99***  0.35***  -0.09  -0.00                0.90 
9  0.14  0.90***                      0.87 
  0.09  0.92***  0.26***                    0.88 
  0.11  0.93***  0.27***  -0.07                  0.89 
  0.10  0.93***  0.27***  -0.07  0.01                0.88 
10  0.23  0.95***                      0.84 
  0.13  0.98***  0.51***                    0.88 
  0.15  0.99***  0.52***  -0.05                  0.88 
  0.15  0.99***  0.52***  -0.05  -0.00                0.88 
11  0.03  0.88***                      0.88 
  -0.03  0.90***  0.29***                    0.90 
  0.00  0.91***  0.30***  -0.10*                  0.90 
  -0.02  0.93***  0.29***  -0.09*  0.02                0.90 
12-13  0.04  0.84***                      0.84 
  -0.01  0.85***  0.25***                    0.86 
  0.06  0.90***  0.27***  -0.26***                  0.87 
  -0.01  0.93***  0.26***  -0.23***  0.08*                0.87 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Looking at Table 5, the values of adjusted R2s show that the regression fits the data well. 
The momentum factor seems to have little to no significance as only 2 portfolios are signif-
icant at a 10% level. The HML-factor is negative and highly significant in 5 of the portfoli-
os when the conventional benchmark is used as a proxy. This implies that the SRI-funds 
could be more composed of growth stocks rather than value stocks, but there is no relation-
ship between screening intensity. The SMB-factor is positive and significant in all of the 
portfolios, indicating a small cap bias in the portfolios.  
 
The betas seem to be decreasing in relation to screening intensity, which could imply a 
support for the overperformance hypothesis as the riskiness of the fund could be diminished 
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due to the selection of companies with good ESG-standards. There seems to be no clear 
relationship with alphas the screening intensity, although majority of alphas are positive. 
This indicates that the funds have over performed the conventional benchmark, although 
none of the coefficients are significant. Table 6. reports the same regressions with merged 
portfolios. 
 
 
Table 6. The effect of screening intensity with merged portfolios vs. MSCI IMI Europe 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.03  0.97***                      0.94 
  -0.01  0.98***  0.17***                    0.94 
  0.02  1.00***  0.18***  -0.08*                              0.94 
  0.02  0.99***  0.18***  -0.08*  -0.00                0.94 
3-4  0.05  0.94***                      0.89 
  -0.02  0.96***  0.37***                    0.92 
  0.02  0.99***  0.39***  -0.17***                  0.92 
  0.03  0.99***  0.39***  -0.18***  -0.00                0.92 
5-6  0.01  0.95***                      0.94 
                -0.02  0.96***  0.16***                    0.95 
  0.02  0.98***  0.18***  -0.14***                  0.95 
  0.05  0.97***  0.18***  -0.15***  -0.03                0.95 
7-8  0.09  0.90***                      0.89 
  0.03  0.93***  0.32***                    0.91 
  0.05  0.94***  0.33***  -0.08                  0.91 
  0.04  0.95***  0.33***  -0.07  0.01                0.91 
9-10  0.14  0.91***                      0.88 
  0.09  0.95***  0.32***  -0.07  0.01                0.90 
  0.10  0.94***  0.32***  -0.07                  0.90 
  0.09  0.95***  0.32***  -0.07  0.01                0.90 
11-13  0.04  0.86***                      0.88 
  -0.01  0.88***  0.27***                    0.90 
  0.04  0.91***  0.28***  -0.17***                  0.90 
  -0.01  0.93***  0.28***  -0.15***  0.05*                0.91 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The merged portfolios report marginally higher values of R2s compared to the individual 
screen portfolios and the trend of betas can be seen more clearly in merged portfolios. Also 
in the case of merged portfolios, the alphas are mainly positive but insignificant. Interest-
ingly, the alphas are rising with screening intensity until the most screened portfolio, which 
would support the overperformance hypothesis. The different results in the last portfolio 
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can be somewhat explained with the small amount of sub funds in the highest screened 
portfolio compared to other portfolios. The next table reports the regressions for screened 
portfolios with an ethical index used as a proxy for a market benchmark. Results are given 
in table 7. 
 
 
Table 7. The effect of screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs STOXX 
Europe Sustainability 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1  0.13  0.92***                      0.89 
  0.07  0.95***  0.29***                    0.90 
  0.07  0.95***  0.30***  -0.00                  0.90 
  0.06  0.96***  0.29***  0.00  0.02                0.90 
2  0.07  0.94***                      0.85 
  0.00  0.98***  0.37***                    0.88 
  0.00  0.97***  0.37***  0.01                  0.88 
  -0.02  0.99***  0.37***  0.02  0.03                0.98 
3  0.07  0.95***                      0.75 
  -0.06  1.02***  0.72***                    0.82 
  -0.01  1.05***  0.74***  -0.17**                  0.82 
  -0.04  1.06***  0.73***  -0.16*  0.03                0.82 
4  0.16  0.86***                      0.85 
  0.08  0.90***  0.41***                    0.88 
  0.10  0.91***  0.41***  -0.06                  0.88 
  0.09  0.92***  0.41***  -0.06  0.01                0.88 
5  0.08  0.93***                      0.90 
  0.03  0.96***  0.28***                    0.91 
  0.05  0.97***  0.28***  -0.07                  0.91 
  0.06  0.97***  0.28***  -0.07  -0.01                0.91 
6  0.12  0.87***                      0.85 
  0.06  0.91***  0.36***                    0.88 
  0.08  0.92***  0.37***  -0.08                  0.88 
  0.11  0.91***  0.37***  -0.09  -0.03                0.88 
7  0.12  0.82***                      0.83
  0.04  0.87***  0.44***                    0.87 
  0.04  0.87***  0.44***  0.00                  0.87 
  -0.01  0.89***  0.44***  0.02  0.05                0.87 
8  0.21  0.90***                      0.82 
  0.13  0.95***  0.48***                    0.86 
  0.13  0.95***  0.48***  -0.01                  0.86 
  0.11  0.96***  0.38***  -0.00  0.02                0.86 
9  0.21  0.85***                      0.80 
  0.14  0.89***  0.39***                    0.83 
  0.14  0.89***  0.39***  0.01                  0.83 
  0.11  0.90***  0.39***  0.02  0.02                0.83 
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Table 7. Continued. 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
10  0.31*  0.89***                      0.75 
  0.19  0.95***  0.65***                    0.82 
  0.18  0.95***  0.65***  0.04                  0.82 
  0.16  0.95***  0.64***  0.04  0.02                0.82 
11  0.10  0.84***                      0.82 
  0.03  0.88***  0.42***                    0.85 
  0.03  0.88***  0.42***  -0.02                  0.85 
  -0.01  0.91***  0.42***  -0.01  0.04                0.85 
12-13  0.11  0.80***                      0.79 
  0.04  0.84***  0.37***                    0.82 
  0.10  0.87***  0.40***  -0.18***                  0.83 
  -0.00  0.92***  0.39***  -0.15***  0.11***                0.84 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The results in table 7 show that the ethical benchmark is less powerful in explaining the 
performance of SRI-funds proven by the lower R2s in table 7 compared to table 5. This is 
in line with the findings of previous literature, that the ethical indices are less powerful in 
explaining the returns of SRI-funds. The betas are also lower which implies greater volatili-
ty in the ethical market benchmark. The SMB-factors are all positive, significant, and high-
er when compared to the conventional benchmark. This tells that the conventional bench-
mark is more exposed to small cap stocks than the ethical index. 
 
The most striking difference when compared to the conventional index is the significance 
of HML-factors. The smaller and less significant coefficients of HML-factors in table 5 
imply that the ethical benchmark is more exposed growth stocks. The alphas are higher but 
none of the 4-factor alphas are significant. Table 8 reports the same regressions with 
merged portfolios 
 
 
Table 8. The effect of screening intensity with merged portfolios vs. STOXX Europe Sus-
tainability 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.11  0.93***                      0.88 
  0.05  0.96***  0.32***                    0.90 
  0.05  0.96***  0.31***  0.00                              0.90 
  0.03  0.97***  0.31***  0.01  0.02                0.90 
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Table 8. Continued 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
3-4  0.13  0.89***                      0.83 
  0.03  0.94***  0.51***                    0.87 
  0.06  0.95***  0.52***  -0.09                  0.87 
  0.04  0.96***  0.52***  -0.09  0.02                0.87 
5-6  0.09  0.91***                      0.90 
  0.03  0.94***  0.31***                    0.91 
  0.05  0.95***  0.31***  -0.07                  0.91 
  0.06  0.95***  0.31***  -0.07  -0.01                0.91 
7-8  0.17  0.86***                      0.83 
  0.08  0.91***  0.46***                    0.87 
  0.04  0.91***  0.46***  -0.00                  0.87 
  0.05  0.93***  0.46***  0.01  0.04                0.87 
9-10  0.21  0.86***                      0.80 
  0.13  0.90***  0.44***                    0.84 
  0.13  0.90***  0.44***  0.01                  0.84 
  0.11  0.91***  0.44***  0.01  0.02                0.84 
11-13  0.12  0.82***                      0.83 
  0.04  0.86***  0.40***                    0.86 
  0.07  0.88***  0.41***  -0.09                  0.86 
  0.00  0.91***  0.40***  -0.07  0.07**                0.86 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
By merging the portfolios, the lower values of R2s are removed and even the lowest value 
of R2 indicates that the model performs better in explaining the merged portfolios. The 
lowering trend of beta when the ethical index is used as a proxy can also be seen more 
clearly in the case of merged portfolios. 
 
The effect of screening intensity to the performance of SRI-funds was examined in the first 
four tables. The alphas were positive in majority of the portfolios which means that SRI-
funds have over performed the market benchmark, both conventional and ethical. The al-
phas do not show signs of consistency when compared to the screening intensity and to the 
contrary to the latest previous literature, the relationship between screening intensity and 
risk adjusted returns is not negative or curvilinear. The most interesting finding is the be-
havior of beta in relation to the screening intensity. Beta values seem to decrease as the 
screening intensity increases, thus showing negative relationship between the two. This is 
shown graphically in figure 8. Also, none of the 4-factor alphas are significant. Neither the 
T-test, or the multiple-regression provided support for the underperformance hypothesis, 
and thus H1 is rejected. On the other hand, the T-test supported the overperformance hy-
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Figure 11. The relationship between screening intensity and fund beta 
pothesis but showed no consistency in the multiple-regression. Thus, there is strong evi-
dence in support of H2. 
 
 
 
7.4. The effect of positive screening intensity to the performance of SRI-funds 
 
The third and fourth hypotheses, that the performance of positively screened funds either 
increases or decreases with screening intensity is examined in the third part of the empirical 
study. Although the T-tests provided no significant differences between low and high 
screened funds, the characteristics of the funds is examined by applying multi-factor re-
gressions to the portfolios. The results for the results for the regressions are presented in 
tables 9-12. 
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Table 9. The effect of positive screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs 
MSCI IMI Europe   
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1  0.15   0.94***                      0.82 
  0.06   0.97***  0.43***                    0.85 
  0.11  1.00***  0.44***  -0.17**                  0.85 
  0.06  1.02***  0.44***  -0.16**  0.05                0.86 
2  -0.19  0.89***                      0.68 
  -0.17  0.89***  0.44***                    0.71 
  -0.17  0.89***  0.44***  0.01                  0.70 
  -0.19  0.90***  0.45***  0.04  0.04                0.70 
3  -0.01  1.03***                      0.76 
  -0.15  1.08***  0.70***                    0.83 
  -0.08  1.12***  0.72***  -0.24***                  0.83 
  -0.10  1.13***  0.72***  -0.23***  0.02                0.83 
4  -0.05  0.92***                      0.82 
  -0.12  0.95***  0.39***                    0.85 
  -0.07  0.98***  0.41***  -0.21***                  0.86 
  -0.10  1.00***  0.41***  -0.20***  0.03                0.86 
5  -0.22  1.02***                      0.76 
  -0.31  1.06***  0.50***                    0.79 
  -0.24  1.11***  0.53***  -0.29***                  0.80 
  -0.25  1.11***  0.53***  -0.29***  0.02                0.80 
6-7  0.02  0.98***                      0.67 
  -0.04  1.00***  0.30**                              0.68 
  0.05  1.06***  0.34***  -0.32***                  0.69 
  0.12  1.03***  0.35***  -0.34***  -0.07**                0.69   
 ***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
As seen from the results, the adjusted R2s are lower in the case of positively screened 
funds, this implies that the model does not explain the data of positive funds as well as the 
whole sample. The variability of R2s can be somewhat explained by the amount of sub-
portfolios in the portfolios 1-7. The momentum-factor, WML has only one significant coef-
ficient in the positive screened portfolios. 
 
The fund betas seem to be increasing with the number of screens applied by the fund. Un-
like in the case of the whole sample, there seems to be a positive relationship with the posi-
tive screening intensity and the fund beta. The coefficients for the SMB-factor are also 
highly significant and higher than in the total sample in all cases, but there is no consisten-
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cy with screening intensity. This shows that the positively screened funds are even more 
composed of small cap stocks compared to the whole sample. 
 
The HML factor is significant and increasing when using the MSCI-index as a proxy for a 
market benchmark. This implies that there is a bias for growth stocks in positively screened 
funds and the relationship is positive with the screening intensity. This is seems logical, as 
the positive screens are common themes for growth firms. The biasness towards growth 
stocks can also be an explanation for the rising betas. The next table reports the same re-
gression with merged portfolios. 
 
Table 10. The effect of positive screening intensity with merged portfolios vs MSCI IMI 
Europe 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.10  0.89***                      0.81 
(2)  0.02  0.92***  0.41***                    0.84 
(3)  0.06  0.95***  0.43***  -0.14**                  0.84 
(4)  0.01  0.97***  0.42***  -0.13*  0.05                0.84 
3-4  -0.03  0.97***                      0.81 
(2)  -0.13  1.01***  0.53***                    0.85 
(3)  -0.07  1.05***  0.55***  -0.23***                  0.86 
(4)  -0.09  1.06***  0.55***  -0.22***  0.03                0.86 
5-7  -0.11  1.00***                      0.76 
(2)  -0.19  1.03***  0.42***                    0.78 
(3)  -0.10  1.08***  0.45***  -0.31***                  0.80 
(4)  -0.07  1.07***  0.45***  -0.32***  -0.03                0.80 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The results for the merged portfolios show on average higher values of R2 and the trend of 
HML-factor can be seen more clearly in table 10. Even though the T-test showed no statis-
tical difference between low and high screened positive funds, the regressions shows signs 
of curvilinear behaviour indicated by a U-shaped relationship between alphas and screening 
intensity, although the results are not statistically significant. The next table provides the 
results for the regression with STOXX Europe Sustainability-index used as a proxy for a 
market benchmark. 
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Table 11. The effect of positive screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs 
STOXX Europe Sustainability 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML  𝑹𝟐 
1  0.23**  0.88***                      0.74 
(2)  0.12  0.94***  0.56***                    0.79 
(3)  0.15  0.95***  0.57***  0.08                  0.79 
(4)  0.08  0.98***  0.57***  -0.06  0.07                0.79 
2  -0.21  0.83***                      0.58 
(2)  -0.19  0.85***  0.53***                    0.63 
(3)  -0.17  0.82***  0.54***  0.12                  0.63 
(4)  -0.20  0.84***  0.56***  0.16  0.06                0.62 
3  0.07  0.97***                      0.68 
(2)   -0.08  1.05***  0.85***                    0.77 
(3)   -0.04  1.07***  0.87***  -0.14                  0.78 
(4)   -0.08  1.09***  0.87***  -0.13  0.04                0.78 
4  0.03  0.87***                      0.75 
(2)  -0.07  0.92***  0.53***                    0.79 
(3)  -0.03  0.94***  0.54***  -0.12                  0.80 
(4)  -0.08  0.96***  0.54***  -0.11  0.05                0.80 
5  -0.14  0.96***                      0.69 
(2)  -0.26  1.02***  0.65***                    0.74 
(3)  -0.20  1.05***  0.68***  -0.19*                  0.74 
(4)  -0.23  1.07***  0.67***  -0.18*  0.03                0.74 
6-7  0.10  0.93***                      0.62 
(2)  0.02  0.98***  0.45***                    0.64 
(3)  0.09  1.01***  0.48***  -0.23*                  0.65 
(4)  0.14  0.99***  0.48***  -0.25**  -0.05                0.65 
 ***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
As seen from the table 11, the values of R2s are lower when compared to table 9, which 
was also in the case of the whole sample. The insignificance of momentum factor is also 
present, although the values are marginally higher. The SMB-factors are statistically signif-
icant in all of the cases and the values are higher with an ethical benchmark, which gives 
more evidence to the claim that the conventional index is more exposed to small cap stocks. 
The HML-factor is not significant in majority of the portfolios signalling that the ethical 
index is more exposed to growth stocks. The alphas are not significant but show signs of 
curvilinearity. The next table gives the results for merged portfolios for the same regres-
sion.  
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Table 12. The effect of positive screening intensity with merged portfolios vs ESTOXX 
Europe Sustainability 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.18  0.84***                      0.72 
(2)  0.08  0.89***  0.54***                    0.78 
(3)  0.09  0.90***  0.55***  -0.06                  0.77 
(4)  0.03  0.93***  0.54***  -0.04  0.06                0.78 
3-4  0.05  0.91***                      0.73 
(2)  -0.07  0.98***  0.67***                    0.80 
(3)  -0.03  1.00***  0.69***  -0.14                  0.80 
(4)  -0.07  1.02***  0.68***  -0.13  0.04                0.80 
5-7  -0.02  0.94***                      0.70 
(2)  -0.13  1.00***  0.56***                    0.74 
(3)  -0.07  1.03***  0.59***  -0.21*                  0.74 
(4)  -0.05  1.03***  0.59***  -0.22*  -0.02                0.74 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
It is now clear that none of the alphas for positively screened portfolios are significant, but 
there is some evidence for curvilinear behaviour between screening intensity and fund per-
formance. The excess returns are not rising with screening intensity, and are not statistically 
significant, thus the overperformance hypothesis for positively screened portfolios is reject-
ed proven by the T-test and the regression. In line with previous literature concerning the 
relationship with screening intensity and excess returns, the effect seems to be somewhat 
curvilinear, but insignificant. The alphas are also on average smaller than for the whole 
sample, indicating that the positive funds have done worse during the sample period of 
2002 to 2014 comparing to all of the SRI-funds. The results for the positively screened 
funds indicate no statistical difference between low and high screened funds. 
 
The most interesting findings in the case of positively screened portfolios are the relation-
ship between the screening intensity and beta, and the relationship between screening inten-
sity and the HML-factor. The relationship between positive screening intensity, beta and 
the HML-factor is shown in figure 12.  
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Figure 12. The relationship between positive screening, beta and HML 
7.5. The effect of negative screening intensity to the performance of SRI-funds 
In the fourth part of the empirical study, the effect of negative screening intensity is exam-
ined. Preliminary results provided by the T-test indicated a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect between screening intensity and the fund performance. The results for the re-
gressions for negatively screened funds are presented in tables 13-16. 
 
 
Table 13. The effect of negative screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs 
MSCI IMI Europe 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1  0.01  0.98***                      0.95 
  -0.00  0.98***  0.05                    0.95 
  0.05  0.98***  0.06  -0.18                  0.95 
  0.02  0.98***  0.06  -0.02  -0.01                0.95 
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Table 13. Continued 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
2  0.01  0.98***                      0.95 
  0.01  0.98***  0.03                    0.95 
  -0.01  0.98***  0.02  0.05                  0.95 
  -0.02  0.98***  0.02  0.06  0.00                0.94 
3  -0.07  0.96***                      0.88 
  -0.13  0.98***  0.32***                    0.89 
  -0.09  1.00***  0.33***  -0.13**                  0.90 
  -0.06  0.99**  0.34***  -0.14**  -0.03                0.90 
4  0.12  0.90***                      0.94 
  0.09  0.91***  0.17***                    0.95 
  0.09  0.91***  0.17***  -0.00                  0.95 
  0.13  0.89***  0.17***  -0.01  -0.04*                0.95 
5  0.02  0.96***                      0.94 
  0.01  0.96***  0.08*                    0.94 
  0.04  0.98***  0.09**  -0.10**                  0.94 
  0.07  0.97***  0.10**  -0.11**  -0.03                0.94 
6  -0.09  0.89***                      0.90
  -0.13  0.91***  0.19***                    0.92 
  -0.08  0.93***  0.20***  -0.13***                  0.92 
  -0.02  0.90***  0.21***  -0.15***  -0.07**                0.92 
7  -0.02  0.85***                      0.78 
  -0.06  0.86***  0.24***                    0.79 
  -0.02  0.88***  0.26***  -0.14*                  0.79 
  -0.02  0.89***  0.26***  -0.14*  0.00                0.79 
8  0.16  0.93***                      0.87 
  0.11  0.95***  0.33***                    0.89 
  0.14  0.97***  0.34***  -0.11*                  0.89 
  0.14  0.97***  0.34***  -0.11*  0.00                0.89 
9  0.15  0.91***                      0.87 
  0.11  0.92***  0.22***                    0.88 
  0.11  0.93***  0.23***  -0.02                  0.88 
  0.13  0.92***  0.23***  -0.02  -0.01                0.88 
10-12  0.16*  0.87***                      0.92 
  0.12  0.88***  0.19***                    0.93 
  0.15*  0.90***  0.21***  -0.10**                  0.93 
  0.15  0.90***  0.20***  -0.10**  0.01                0.93       
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 13 shows that the regression is explaining the data on a good basis indicated by the 
high values of R2. Continuing the trend of the findings of earlier regressions, the momen-
tum factor is significant in only 2 of the portfolios. The HML-factor gives out mixed results 
and there seems to be no consistency in the findings. The SMB-factor is highly significant 
in 7 of the portfolios showing a slight bias towards small cap stocks although the coeffi-
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cients are smaller compared to those of positively screened funds. Unlike in the case of 
positively screened portfolios, the beta is decreasing in relation with screening intensity. 
This could very well indicate that a fund employing several negative screens to the portfo-
lio minimizes the risks of companies with bad environmental or social records. The alphas 
of the portfolios are not significant but unlike in previous literature, the results in table 13 
show signs of a positive relationship between the performance of negatively screened funds 
and fund performance as the alphas in the funds employing 8 to 12 screens are higher than 
in the funds employing 1 to 3 screens. The next table shows the results for the same regres-
sion with merged portfolios. 
 
Table 14. The effect of negative screening intensity with merged portfolios vs. MSCI IMI 
Europe  
# of Screens (factor) α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.01  0.98***                      0.95 
  0.00  0.98***  0.05                    0.95 
  0.00  0.98***  0.05  -0.00                  0.95 
  0.01  0.98***  0.05  -0.00  -0.01                0.95 
3-4  0.09  0.91***                      0.94 
  0.05  0.93***  0.20***                    0.95 
  0.05  0.93***  0.21***  -0.02                  0.95 
  0.09  0.91***  0.21***  -0.03  -0.04                0.95 
5-6  0.01  0.94***                      0.94 
  -0.01  0.95***  0.10**                    0.94 
  0.02  0.96***  0.11***  -0.10**                  0.95 
  0.05  0.95***  0.12***  -0.11***  -0.03                0.95 
7-8  0.07  0.88***                      0.86 
  0.02  0.90***  0.28***                    0.88 
  0.05  0.92***  0.30***  -0.12**                  0.88 
  0.05  0.93***  0.30***  -0.12**  0.00                0.88 
9-12  0.15  0.89***                      0.90 
  0.11  0.91***  0.21***                    0.91 
  0.13  0.92***  0.22***  -0.05                  0.91 
  0.13  0.91***  0.22***  -0.05  -0.01                     0.91 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
The results for merged portfolios in table 14 are similar to that of the results in table 13. 
The decreasing trend of beta can be seen more clearly but other than that the findings are 
consistent with the previous table. Only difference is the positive values of alphas in all of 
the portfolios which signal that the negatively screened funds have over performed the con-
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ventional market benchmark, and the positively screened funds during the time period of 
2002-2014. Next table shows the results for the regression with the ethical index used as a 
proxy for a market benchmark. 
 
Table 15. The effect of negative screening intensity on the performance of SRI-funds vs 
Estoxx sustainability 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1  0.09  0.93***                      0.89 
(2)  0.06  0.96***  0.20***                    0.90 
(3)  0.04  0.95***  0.19***  0.06                  0.90 
(4)  0.03  0.95***  0.19***  0.06  0.01                0.90 
2  0.09  0.94***                      0.89 
(2)  0.06  0.96***  0.17**                    0.89 
(3)  0.02  0.94***  0.15**  0.14**                  0.89 
(4)  -0.00  0.95***  0.15**  0.14**  0.02                0.89 
3  0.00  0.91***                      0.80 
(2)  -0.07  0.95***  0.46***                    0.84 
(3)  -0.06  0.96***  0.46***  -0.04                  0.84 
(4)  -0.04  0.95**  0.46***  -0.05  -0.02                0.84 
4  0.19*  0.86***                      0.88 
(2)  0.14  0.89***  0.30***                    0.90 
(3)  0.12  0.88***  0.29***  0.07                  0.90 
(4)  0.14  0.87***  0.29***  0.07  -0.02                0.90 
5  0.10  0.93***                      0.91 
(2)  0.06  0.95***  0.22***                    0.91 
(3)  0.07  0.95***  0.23***  -0.03                  0.91 
(4)  0.07  0.95***  0.23**  -0.03  -0.00                0.91 
6  -0.02  0.86***                      0.86 
(2)  -0.07  0.89***  0.32***                    0.88 
(3)  -0.06  0.90***  0.33***  -0.06                  0.88 
(4)  -0.01  0.88***  0.33***  -0.07  -0.04                0.88 
7  0.05  0.81***                      0.74 
(2)  -0.01  0.85***  0.37***                    0.77 
(3)  0.01  0.86***  0.38***  -0.07                  0.77 
(4)  -0.02  0.87***  0.38***  -0.06  0.03                0.76 
8  0.24  0.89***                      0.81 
(2)  0.16  0.93***  0.47***                    0.85 
(3)  0.17  0.94***  0.48***  -0.03                  0.85 
(4)  0.14  0.95***  0.47***  -0.03  0.03                0.85 
9  0.23  0.86***                      0.80 
(2)  0.16  0.90***  0.36***                    0.83 
(3)  0.14  0.89***  0.35***  0.06                  0.83 
(4)  0.14  0.89***  0.35***  0.06  0.00                0.82 
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Table 15. Continued 
# of Screens α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
10-12  0.23*  0.83***                      0.87 
(2)  0.17*  0.87***  0.32***                    0.90 
(3)  0.18*  0.87***  0.33***  -0.03                  0.90 
(4)  0.15  0.89***  0.33***  -0.02  0.03                0.90       
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The ethical benchmark is clearly less powerful in explaining also the returns of negatively 
screened SRI-funds as the values of R2s are lower in each of the portfolios compared to the 
regression where a conventional benchmark is used as a proxy. As in the case of conven-
tional benchmark, the coefficients for HML factors are not as prolific as in the case of posi-
tive funds. The decreasing trend of beta is evident also in the case of ethical proxy, alt-
hough the values are lower when compared to the conventional benchmark. Also, the al-
phas are slightly higher compared to table 13, which shows that the ethical index has per-
formed worse compared to the conventional index. The last table provides the results for 
merged portfolios with the ethical benchmark. 
 
 
Table 16. The effect of negative screening intensity with merged portfolios vs. ESTOXX 
Europe Sustainability index 
# of Screens (factor) α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
1-2  0.09  0.94***                      0.90 
(2)  0.06  0.96***  0.19***                    0.90 
(3)  0.03  0.94***  0.18***  0.08                  0.90 
(4)  0.02  0.95***  0.18***  0.08  0.01                0.90 
3-4  0.16  0.87***                      0.87 
(2)  0.10  0.90***  0.34***                    0.90 
(3)  0.09  0.89***  0.33***  0.06                  0.90 
(4)  0.11  0.88***  0.33***  0.05  -0.02                0.90 
5-6  0.08  0.90***                      0.91 
(2)  0.04  0.93***  0.24***                    0.92 
(3)  0.05  0.94***  0.25***  -0.03**                  0.92 
(4)  0.06  0.94***  0.25***  -0.03***  -0.00                0.92 
7-8  0.14  0.85***                      0.81 
(2)  0.07  0.89***  0.42***                    0.85 
(3)  0.09  0.90***  0.42***  -0.05                  0.85 
(4)  0.06  0.91***  0.42***  -0.04  0.03                0.85 
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Table 16. Continued 
# of Screens (factor) α  β  SMB  HML  WML            Ad. 𝑹𝟐 
9-12  0.22*  0.85***                      0.84 
(2)  0.17  0.88***  0.35***                    0.87 
(3)  0.16  0.88***  0.34***  0.03                  0.87 
(4)  0.15  0.89***  0.34***  0.03  0.01                0.86 
***=Significant at 1% level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Looking at table 17, the HML-factor is smaller and less significant in the negative screened 
portfolios compared to those of the positively screened portfolios. Also, the HML-factor is 
not consistent with the negative screening intensity. This implies that there is not a same 
kind of biasness towards growth stocks as there is in positive screened portfolios. 
 
Looking at the results of the negatively screened portfolios in total, the alphas are higher 
than in the positively screened portfolios and the T-test provided evidence that the differ-
ence is statistically significant at a 10% level. By applying the Carhart 4-regression, the 
results showed that the negatively screened funds have performed better compared to the 
positively screened funds, although the results are not significant. 
 
For the total sample, the T-test provided statistically significant evidence at 10% level that 
the high screened SRI-funds have overperformed low screened funds during the time period 
of 2002 to 2014. The multifactor model also supported the results of the T-tests, although 
the alphas were not significant and the most screened portfolio underperformed other port-
folios. Overall the evidence is supporting the overperformance hypothesis although the re-
sults of the multifactor regressions are not significant. 
 
The results for positively screened funds are mixed. The T-test provided no significant re-
sults between high and low screened funds and the multifactor model showed no consisten-
cy between screening intensity and fund performance, although it is clear that the positively 
screened funds have underperformed when compared to the negatively screened funds. The 
relationship between alpha and screening intensity shows signs of curvilinearity, which is 
in line with previous literature, but the results are not statistically significant. 
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According to the T-tests and the multi-factor regressions, the relationship between negative 
screening intensity and fund performance seems to be positive but not monotonic. The T-
test showed a statistically significant difference at a 5% level in performance between high 
and low screened funds and the multifactor regression provided additional support for the 
overperformance hypothesis. Based on the evidence provided by the T-tests and multifactor 
regressions, the underperformance hypothesis is rejected and the overperformance hypothe-
sis is accepted. The screening intensity seems to increase the performance of negatively 
screened funds, and it seems that the screening process is able to filter the companies with 
good ESG standards resulting in good performance indicated by the positive alphas, alt-
hough the effect is not entirely linear. The relationship between each type of screening in-
tensity and alpha is shown graphically in figures 10-12. 
 
 
Figure 13. Relationship between Screening intensity and alpha 
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Figure 15. Relationship between negative screening intensity and alpha 
Figure 14. Relationship between positive screening intensity and alpha 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
Socially responsible investing has gained it’s foothold during the last decades. The findings 
of the previous studies have been inconsistent, but the latest results have been positive from 
the perspective of SRI-funds. The empirical part of this study gave mixed results but pro-
vided evidence that there are significant differences between the funds employing either 
only positive or negative screens. The two common hypothesis used in the previous litera-
ture were examined in this paper and the results provided no support for the underperfor-
mance hypothesis, but gave some evidence in support for the overperformance, implying 
that the increasing screening intensity increases the performance of the SRI-fund. 
 
The first finding as a result of the literature review was that there seems to be a slight disa-
greement on the emergence of SRI. The studies in North America seem to be biased on the 
claim that socially responsible investing, or ethical investing was born in the United States 
during 1960s and 1970s. But the new European studies show evidence that funds with ethi-
cal screening existed before that in the UK and Sweden (Bengtsson, 2008; Scholtens & 
Sievänen 2013; Eurosif 2012). It could be said that ethical investing had been practiced 
before the 1970s, but the social movements during that time in the US popularized the con-
cept. 
 
Second, in newer studies, the status of SRI-funds seem to have been accepted as a true 
method of investing and the performance of these funds are compared to other similar funds 
instead of conventional funds. Also the growth in the amount of benchmark-indices have 
made it possible to compare SRI-funds in several different ways. (Barnett et al. 2006; Lee 
et al. 2010.) 
 
Third, there seems to be a repeating empirical finding in the literature concerning SRI funds 
that is not dependent on the complexity of the model that is used. According to the studies, 
the performance of socially responsible investment funds are comparable to normal invest-
ment funds, meaning that is there is no statistical difference in risk-adjusted returns be-
tween the portfolios. Also, there seems to be no difference between the countries and the 
model used. (Statman 2000; Schröder 2004; Kreander et al. 2005; Bauer et al. 2005; Bauer 
et al. 2006.)  
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Fourth, the use of multifactor models has emerged as the dominating way in evaluating the 
performance of socially responsible investments funds. There is a clear movement from the 
use of single-factor model to the use of Fama-French 3-factor model and to the Carhart 4-
factor model. It would be plausible to expect that the amount of factors increases in the 
future, in order to achieve more significant results. On the other hand, it should be noted 
that the market size seems to have some effect on the performance. Smaller market leads to 
the situation where there are less diversified portfolios. The screening intensity affects 
smaller markets more because the number of available stocks is smaller, which leads to less 
diverse portfolio.  There are also some differences in the composition SRI-funds between 
the countries, for example the US based funds tend to overweigh blue chip companies, and 
European portfolios are more invested in the use of small cap companies. (Bauer et al. 
2005: 1762; Bauer et al. 2006; Cortez, Silva & Areal 2012: 254, 269-270) 
 
The evidence from previous literature states that there is no clear disadvantage on ESG 
screening and less diverse investment universe of SRI-funds doesn't necessarily mean that 
investors should expect lower performance when compared to the more conventional in-
vestment funds. The real issue is the screening intensity. According to the studies, the 
screening intensity seems to have a negative, or curvilinear relationship with the perfor-
mance of the socially responsible investment funds. (Schröder 2004, 131; Barnett & Salo-
mon 2006; Lee et al. 2010; Cortez et al. 2012) 
 
The empirical part of this paper divided the screening intensity to two different compo-
nents, negative and positive. The T-tests provided results that showed a significant differ-
ences between the two methods, and thus the effects of the individual screening intensities 
were examined by applying a Carhart 4-Factor regression. The empirical results showed 
that first of all, the conventional benchmark is more powerful than the ethical benchmark in 
explaining the performance of SRI-funds and second, the results of the study are more in 
favor for the positive effect of screening intensity to the SRI-fund performance. 
 
In the case of the whole sample, and with negatively screened funds, the relationship be-
tween screening intensity and beta seems to be negative. One explanation for this could be 
that the negative screening strategy succeeds in filtering out the companies with bad ESG-
standards, and in including the companies with good ESG-standards, resulting in a superior 
performance (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick 2001). The Carhart 4-factor model provided sup-
72 
 
 
 
port for the overperformance hypothesis as the alphas were rising monotonically until the 
most screened portfolio, although none of the alphas were statistically significant. Also, it 
seems that SRI-funds have overperformed both the conventional and ethical market indices 
during 2002 to 2014. 
 
The results of positively screened funds suggest a positive and monotonic relationship be-
tween screening intensity and beta. The coefficients for the HML-factor were increasing 
monotonically with the screening intensity, and the SMB-factor was negative and signifi-
cant when the conventional index was used as a proxy. This implies that positively 
screened funds are more composed of small growth stocks, which could explain the rising 
betas, as growth stocks tend to be more volatile compared to value stocks. The relationship 
between screening intensity and alpha showed signs of curvilinearity, but the results were 
not statistically significant. Whereas the total sample of SRI-funds used in the study were 
performing better than the market, positively screened were on average bearing negative 
alphas. 
 
The examination of negatively screened funds provided overall the most evidence in sup-
port of the overperformance hypothesis. The Sharpe & Sortino ratios were positive and 
rising in relation with screening intensity, and the Carhart 4-factor model provided evi-
dence of a positive relationship between screening intensity and fund performance, alt-
hough the effect was non-monotonic and the alphas were not statistically significant. In 
contrary to majority of the previous literature, the results of the empirical study suggest a 
positive relationship between screening intensity and fund performance for negatively 
screened funds. On the other hand, the effect seems to be curvilinear in the case of positive-
ly screened funds, which is more in line with the previous researches. (Barnett et al. 2006.) 
 
In future research, the Fama-French 5-factor model could be applied for more accurate re-
sults. Although the paper where the model was introduced was already published when this 
study was made, the variables for the factors were not yet available for European markets. 
The US-market loadings could’ve been applied in this paper also, but according to Griffin 
(2002) the use market specific loadings yields better results.  Also, the amount of funds 
employing purely positive screens is bound to increase in the future and larger sample data 
would increase the accuracy of the results. 
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